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PHILIP J.

KAIN

Hegel's Political Theory and Philosophy of History
I. Hegel's historical and political thought can best be understood if
we understand its relationship to Rousseau's political theory and Kant's
philosophy of history.
Hegel's conception of the modern state closely resembles
Rousseau's ideal community which was based upon rational freedom
realized through a general wUl and reinforced by custom and tradition which shaped the character and interests of the citizens. However,
Rousseau's community was Utopian—it could not be realized in the
modern world. It was incompatible with commerce and trade which
promote particular interest and thus corrupt custom and erode the
general will. These matters will be discussed in Section III.
To explain the possibility of the ideal state in the modern world,
Hegel turns to Kant's philosophy of history where commerce, trade,
and conflicting particular interests themselves lead to what' morahty-the categorical imperative or the general will—would demand. Kant's
ideal state, however, completely lacks custom, tradition, and
community—what Hegel calls "Sittlichkeit." These matters will be
discussed in Section II.
Hegel's goal, then, is to combine three things: (1) rational
freedom of the sort realized through a general will or categorical
imperative, (2) a theory of historical development in which conflicting
particular interests lead to a moral society, and (3) custom, tradition,
or Sittlichkeit. To do this Hegel will have to reject certain aspects of
the thought of Rousseau and Kant and he will have to explain how
custom, tradition, and community instead of being corrupted by particular interests can come to be compatible with them. The key to
this will be Hegel's concept of spirit. These matters will be discussed
in Section IV. Let us begin with Kant.
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II. In the "Idea for a Universal History," Kant claims that individuals
motivated by inclinations, desires, and particular interests, nevertheless
further, without realizing it, a common but unknown purpose. The
key to this historical purposiveness is what Kant calls "unsocial
sociability." Humans have an unsocial propensity toward self-interest,
but they also have a social propensity to associate with others in society.'
These two factors produce competition, conflict, and even war.
However, competition and selfishness also drive us to accomplish
things, and they drive us toward the fullest development of our powers
and capacities. This development, for Kant, will eventually lead to
a society of peace and morality.'
So also, for Kant, there is an unsocial sociability between nations.
The unsocial assertion of national self-interest drives nations toward
aggression and war. But there is also an important form of sociability
between nations—their concern with commerce and trade. As conflicts and wars become more destructive and expensive, they come
mto conflict with trade. As nations become more commercially interdependent, war poses an ever greater threat to the smooth functioning of the international market. Other nations will intervene to
prevent war, and thus, for Kant, we move toward peace, justice, and
a league of nations.^
For Kant, there are two forces at work in history. The first is
the conflict of particular interests. The second is morality. And both,
for Kant, lead to the very same end—peace, justice and a league of
nations. Conflicts and wars, Kant says, are leading toward what moral
reflection would have demanded from the start {UH 18-19 PP
112-13).
'
'
For Kant, the categorical imperative requires us to act only on
maxims which we could will to be universal laws.^ Morality is based
upon reason, not interest. We must rationally analyze our m a x i m s ask if they can be universalized without contradiction—in order to
separate our interests or inclinations about a particular act from our
abstract rational assessment of what is moral in general. Only if we
follow reason are we free, self-determined, and moral. If we act upon
our interests, we are determined heteronomously by natural forces and
we are not free.*
The categorical imperative would demand just laws, an end to
wars, and a league of nations {PP, 100). We could not will to universalize war, unjust laws, and international lawlessness. Moreover, the
other force at work in history drives us to the very same point that
morality does. Both morality and the conflict of particular interests
converge toward the same end—one consciously, the other unconsciously {UH, 18-19. PP, 111-13).
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The notion that conflicting self-interests lead toward what morality
demands, Kant gets, I think, from Adam Smith. In a market economy,
for Smith, self-seeking not only produces a common good, but it does
so more effectively than if individuals had consciously and cooperatively
sought this good. It produces a national capital—a common good—
through an "invisible hand," that is, behind our backs and despite
our intentions.^
For Kant too we find such an invisible hand operating within
society:
many say a republic would have to be a nation of angels, because
men with their selfish inclinations are not capable of a constitution
of such sublime form. But precisely with these inclinations nature comes
to the aid of the general will established on reason. . . . Thus it is
only a question of a good organization of the state . . . whereby the
powers of each selfish inclination are so arranged in opposition that
one moderates or destroys the ruinous effect of the other. The consequence for reason is the same as if none of them existed, and man
is forced to be a good citizen even if not a morally good person. {PP,
112)

While Hegel, unlike Kant, does not think that world history is
leading to peace, a league of nations, or international \Z^N,^ nevertheless, Hegel, very much like Kant, relies on an invisible hand argument both in his philosophy of history and in his theory of civil society. For Hegel, particular interest or passion is the active force in history
which gives rise to the universal. Human passions and the universal
Idea are the warp and the woof of world history.' Hegel says.
The particular interests of passion cannot . . . be separated from the
realization of the universal. . . . Particular interests contend with one
another . . . But it is from this very conflict and destruction of particular things that the universal emerges, and it remains unscathed
itself. For it is not the universal Idea which enters into opposition,
conflict, and danger; it keeps itself in the background, untouched and
unharmed, and sends forth the particular interests of passion to fight,
and wear themselves out in its stead. It is what we may call the cunning of reason that it sets the passions to work in its service, so that
the agents by which it gives itself existence must pay the penalty and
suffer the loss. {IPH, 89)

World history, for Hegel, occurs as the universal Idea is realized
through the conflict of particular interests—a conflict which produces
effects quite different from what the individuals consciously intended
to accomplish {IPH, 82, 75).
So also, in his discussion of civil society in the Philosophy of Right,
Hegel, much as for Kant, follows Adam Smith. Civil society is a system
of economic interdependence where self-seeking unconsciously produces
the satisfaction of the needs of all. Competitive self-seeking produces

348

Hegel's Political Theory and Philosophy of History

a common capital from which each struggles to gain their share. Conflicting particular interests lead to the universal. Moreover, for Hegel,
a state is well constituted when the private interests of the citizen^
coincide with the general end of the state (PR, 127, 129-30. IPH, 73).
So far, the views of Hegel and Kant are quite similar. Now we
must look to the differences. In the first place, for Hegel, we cannot
say that there are two different forces at work in history-the conflict
of particular interests and morality-as for Kant. "The particular interests of passion cannot . . . be separated from the realization of the univer-

sal" {IPH, 89; my italics). We can begin to understand Hegel's views
on this matter if we look to the section of the Phenomenology entided
"Virtue and the Way of the World." Most commentators on the
Phenomenology think that this section refers to Don Quixote. None of
them, that I am aware of, see what it really refers to, which is so
very dearly Kant's philosophy of history.
In this section, Hegel's description of "virtue" clearly indicates
that he has Kant's ethics in mind. Virtue is the consciousness that
law is essential and that individuality—which is to say, particular
interest—must be sacrificed to the universal. Virtue wills to accomplish
the good which is not yet actual; the universal is an "ought" which
must be realized. It can be realized only through virtue's nullifying
of individuality.« For the "way of the world," on the other hand,
individuality takes itself to be essential and it pursues self-interest. It
seeks its own pleasure and enjoyment, and in doing so it subordinates
the universal to itself For Kant, both morality and the conflict of
particular interests converge toward the same universal end. So also,
for Hegel, the way of the world, through the conflict of particular
interests, achieves the universal—the same universal that virtue seeks
{PS, 228-29, 235). For Kant, it was morality's task to guide the
historical conflict of particular interests and to hasten it toward its
end. For Hegel, virtue too attempts to assist the way of the world
to realize the universal. At this point, however, Hegel's disagreement
with Kant begins. Hegel argues that, in fact, virtue's assistance is
unnecessary, the way of the world is quite capable of realizing the universal on its own. Virtue's assistance is a sham {PS, 230-32). Virtue wants
to bring the good into existence by the sacrifice of particular interest.
But the conflict of particular interests is what actually realizes the
universal. Virtue wants to realize the universal as something that ought
to be rather than as something which is. The way of the world is our
first dim view in the Phenomenology of Sittlichkeit—morality which appears
not merely as an ought, but which is. Hegel says:
Virtue in the ancient world has its own definite sure meaning, for
It had in the spiritual substance of the nation a foundation full of mean-
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ing, and for its purpose an actual good already in existence. Consequently, too, it was not directed against the actual world as agamst
something generally perverted, and against a "way of the world." But
the virtue we are considering has its being outside of the spiritual substance,
it is an unreal virtue, a virtue in imagination and name only, which
lacks that substantial content. (PS, 234; the last italics are mine)

Thus, for Hegel, we must drop the idea that virtue exists only
as a principle, an ought, which as yet has no actual existence and
which is brought into existence through the sacrifice of individuality,
particular interest, or passion. Hegel's objection to Kantian morality,
or "virtue," is that it is abstract, outside the world, an ought, and
it believes that only it can realize morality.^ It has severed itself from
the concrete actual world of interest and passion, and it faces it as
an other. From this superior position it wants to direct the world.
Instead, morality must be rooted in the world. Or to put this another
way, the point Hegel is making here is that Kant's philosophy of
history and his ethics are written from the perspective of individual
consciousness—the perspective that there are only individual consciousnesses. Morality, for Kant, is a matter of individual will
abstracted from the concrete actual world. Certainly, for Kant, inclinations and interests, which are part of the actual world of natural
causality, are to be carefully separated and excluded from the realm
of the individual moral will if the individual is to be self-determined
and thus free. This separation is what Hegel objects to. Kant has no
notion of spirit or Sittlichkeit, which are beginning to emerge here in
the Phenomenology. Sittlichkeit is morality embedded in a concrete spiritual
world. For Hegel, virtue and the way of the world, particular interest
and the universal, morality and the concrete world, are not separate
opposed realities externally related to each other. They are internally
related as parts of a single spiritual reality which already exists, not
something which merely ought to be realized. For Hegel, individual
consciousness is the internalization of the social world and the social
world is the outcome of the actions of individual consciousnesses. Each
develops in interaction with the other, and each transforms the other.
They are two parts of one spiritual unity.
Hegel agrees with the Kantian and Smithian notion that a conflict of particular interests leads to the universal. What Hegel does
not accept is that this can be understood merely at the level of individual consciousness. It must be understood at the level of spirit.
Spirit explains how individual interest—the concrete way of the
world—is connected to virtue. This will become clearer in Section IV,
but here we can at least say that confiict between particular interests
gives rise to a set of institutions, a world, which comes to have a
life of its own, and which reacts back upon and molds those individual
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consciousnesses and thus leads them to virtue. Particular interests and
virtue are not two eternally separate realms external to one another.
They are internally related as two interacting parts enclosed within
a single spiritual unity, and each produces the other. Virtue is simply
mistaken in thinking itself independent and outside of this spiritual
reality, superior to it, and thus able to guide particular interests from
above. In fact, for Hegel, we cannot guide history at all as Kant thinks
we can. History is not a matter of individual will, but of spirit. Individuals are unconscious tools of world spirit. Moreover, there is no
ought that the individual will can independently set out to realize.
Morality already exists as this spiritual unity which encloses us and
is our very being. Hegel's task is to reconcile us to what is by allowing us to correctly understand what is. His aim is to transform our
understanding of reality so that we accept it, not to transform reality
in accordance with an ought {PR, 11-12. IPH, 170-71).
To understand this critique of Kant more clearly, we must notice
that Hegel distinguishes between two forms of morality—Aíora/ító/ and
Sittlichkeit. Moralität begins with Socrates and reaches its high point
m Kant. Moralität is individual, rational, and reflective morality based
upon individual autonomy and personal conviction. One must
rationally decide what is moral and do it because it is moral—because
our rationality tells us that it is the right thing to do. This rational
and reflective component is absent in Sittlichkeit. Sittlichkeit is best
represented in the Greek polis before the rise of Socratic Moralität.
Sittlichkeit is ethical behavior grounded in custom and tradition and
developed through habit and imitation in accordance with the objective laws of the community. Personal reflection and analysis have little
to do with Sittlichkeit {IPH, 97). Sittlichkeit is ethical life built into one's
character, attitudes, and feelings.
Furthermore, Moralität involves an "ought"—morality ought to
be realized. This "ought" is also absent from Sittlichkeit. For it, morality
IS not something we ought to realize, something we ought to be.
Morality exists—it is. Morality is already embedded in our customs,
traditions, character, attitudes, and feelings. Here there is no opposition between particular interest and the universal. There is no
opposition between subject and object. The objective ethical order exists in, is actualized in, is the essence of, the subject {PR 109 PS
212-16).
\ '
• .
What Hegel wants for the modem world in neither traditional
Sittlichkeit nor modern Moralität. He wants a synthesis of Sittlichkeit and
Moralität which, though at times confusing, he also calls Sittlichkeit. This
higher Sittlichkeit combines the rational and reflective side of Moralität
with the transcendence of the ought characteristic of Sittlichkeit. Rational
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reflective morality is concretely embedded in the customs, traditions,
character, and feelings of individuals. We have a reflective consciousness of the ethical substance {PS, 216).
Sittlichkeit without Moralität is adequate for Hegel. So also, Hegel
rejects Kantian Moralität without Sittlichkeit. This was implied in "Virtue
and the Way of the World," but it becomes clearer in following sections of the Phenomenology where Hegel goes on to argue that Kantian
Moralität shorn of Sittlichkeit, in fact, is impossible. He argues that one
cannot discover one's moral obligation in Kantian fashion simply by
analyzing abstract principles to see if they are universal and noncontradictory. For example, private property as well as its oppositecommon ownership—are equally universalizable and noncontradictory.
Without Sittlichkeit—W\ÛiO\it. an immediately given, objective, ethical
substance embedded in custom and tradition which actually is rather
that merely ought to be—it is impossible to discover through analysis
one's moral obligation. Moralität gets its content from Sittlichkeit {PS,
257-61. PR, 36, 90. IPH, 80).
Moreover, Moralität without Sittlichkeit would leave us with an
inadequate form of freedom. For Kant, individual subjectivity alone
is free. Individuals are free when practical reason determines their
action. The individual, however, is not necessarily free to realize this
moral action. The objective world may well present obstacles to the
carrying out of the action, without, for Kant, affecting the individual's
moral freedom in the least {F, 10, 16. CPrR, 71). For Kant, such
empirical factors, whether they be obstacles or aids, must be completely ignored. They are irrelevant to freedom. Nor do feelings or
inclinations play a role here. They need not support the action; nor
is our freedom affected if they are opposed to the moral action.'" For
Hegel, on the other hand, freedom is realized only when the objective
external world and our feelings fit, agree with, and support the subjective rational freedom of the individual. Laws and institutions, feelings and customs, as well as the rationality of the individual must
form a single organic spiritual unity. Thus, for Hegel, freedom requires
three things: (1) that the individual be self-determined by universal
and rational principles, (2) that rationality have been objectified in
the laws and institutions of the state such that in obeying civil laws
we obey the laws of our own reason, and (3) that interests, feelings,
and customs have been molded so as to agree with and support these
rational laws such that particular interests are satisfied and yet lead
to the universal."
For Kant, the possibility of freedom required that the
transcendental self not be located in the natural, causally determined,
phenomenal world. Another—a noumenal realm—was required. A
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sphere apart from the natural sphere was necessary as the source of
self-determined, free action {F, 69-73. CPrR, 28, 50). In rejecting the
existence of an unknown thing-in-itself,'^ Hegel rejects the existence
of this separate noumenal realm. Rather than locate a transcendental
self in a realm apart (as virtue was opposed to the way of the world),
he denies that there are such different realms. Instead, there is a singlé
spiritual realm split into two parts—an individual subjective realm and
an objective substantial realm. These two sides react against each other
and each produces the other. Ultimately the natural objective element
is absorbed into the conscious subjective element. In this way the object is no longer alien or other. Individual action and interests give
rise to an objective worldly reality which then turns upon the
individuals, molds them, and lifts them to the level of universality.
The subject does not confront the object as a heteronomous other.
The object is the outcome of the subject's own activity, the realization of the subject's essence, and thus the object is compatible with
the subject's freedom. The subject is not externafly related to the object, but internally related to it as its own essence.
Individuals work on their world through history and transform
it to fit themselves {IPH, 64), just as the world transforms individuals
so that they conform to it. In confronting their world, individuals confront and discover themselves. For Hegel, they confront their own
rationality objectified in the world. This fit between the subjective rationality of the individual and the objective rationality of the world
when supported by custom, tradition, and feeling, is the basis of
Sittlichkeit. To pursue this further, we must now turn to Rousseau.
III. Rousseau wants to design an ideal state in which the general will
can manifest itself. It can do so, given four conditions which Rousseau
lays out in the Social Contract, but not neady afl in one place. The
four conditions are the foflowing: (1) All citizens must vote as
individuals on all questions or laws. (2) All questions put to these
citizens must have an abstract and universal form; they must not name
a particular person or fact. (3) The question put must always and
only be, "what is the general will on this matter?" You must not
address the citizens as individuals and ask them what their particular
interests are. (4) All laws must be rigorously and equally enforced,
and everyone must realize when they are voting that this will be thé
case.''
The point here is to address only an individual's abstract, reflective, rational interest, not their personal, particular, selfish interest.
Citizens are made to reflect upon what it would be like if everyone
always acted in a specific way. We get them to consider the action
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as a universal and necessary principle—as a categorical imperative in
Kant's terminology.
If they do so, even thieves would vote against theft. If we were
only to address the particular interest of thieves, we might well get
some quite convincing justifications of those particular acts of theft.
But if we address the abstract, reflective, rational interest, even of
thieves; if we ask whether in general, in all cases, everyone should
be allowed to steal by laws which are rigorously and equally enforced
for all; then even thieves would vote against theft.
The difference between Rousseau and Kant is that for Rousseau
the citizens are expected to vote their interest in the general abstract
case—their long-term interest as citizens of a community rather than
their immediate interest as particular persons. For Kant, we must avoid
interest altogether. Hegel, who, as we have already seen, is critical
of Kant's abstract opposition of morality to particular interest, in this
respect would be closer to Rousseau.
Furthermore, for Rousseau, the general will must be reinforced
by what Hegel would call Sittlichkeit. Citizens are only free if the
customs which shape inclination and feeling accord with the general
will and reason. Rousseau says, "To these . . . laws is added . . . the
most important of all; which is not engraved on marble or bronze,
but in the hearts of the citizens . . . I am speaking of mores, customs,
and especially of opinion—a part of the laws unknown to our political
theorists, but on which the success of all the others depends."'*
Custom and tradition would be reinforced, for Rousseau, by a
civil religion which combines simple, inner, personal commitment with
a sentiment of sociability and respect for laws. And these healthy
customs, traditions, and public opinion would be maintained by a censorial tribunal which, though incapable of creating, changing, or
reestablishing customs and traditions, merely declares what they are
in an attempt to preserve them and to slow down their corruption
{SC, 123-31).
For Rousseau, there is a tendency for the customs and traditions of any community to become corrupted. Rousseau argues in the
Discourse on Inequality that in simple, healthy, egalitarian communities,
as soon as agriculture and metallurgy develop and surplus production
occurs, society is plunged into inequality, conflict of interests, and the
corruption of customs.'^ Moreover, Rousseau thinks that once healthy
customs have been corrupted, all is lost. They can never be revived
{SC, 70. DI, 80). Wealth, unequal property, and commerce are the
main causes of this corruption. They promote self-interest and erode
the citizen's commitment to the public good. They corrupt custom,
tradition, and patriotism which then will no longer be able to rein-
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force the general will. Moreover, they can even erode the general will
directly. They will make it all the more difficult for the citizens to
transcend their immediate interests and to concern themselves with
abstract questions, or to ask "what is the common good?" or "what
is the general will?" instead of "what do I want?" {DI, 199-200).
Thus Rousseau is a Utopian. He does not think his ideal state
is possible in the modern world. It is incompatible with commerce,
trade, particular interest, and the corruption they produce. And once
customs and traditions have been corrupted, all is lost. They cannot
be revived. For a decent society to be possible, healthy customs and
traditions must simply be given in a traditional and premodem society.
Hegel certainly wants a state which realizes the universal or the
general will, and he wants it reinforced by custom, tradition, and
Sittlichkeit. But he also wants such a state to be possible in the modern
world and thus compatible with wealth, commerce, and trade. He
therefore needs a theory that will explain how custom and tradition,
without becoming corrupt, can develop and be maintained in a
changing modern society involving commerce and trade.
To understand this theory, we must notice that Hegel differs
from Rousseau in that for him customs and traditions are not simply
given conditions—the groundwork—upon which the institutions of a
state are to be established. Rather, Sittlichkeit, that is, custom and tradition, the feelings and attitudes of the citizens, are continually being
produced by social and political institutions. Patriotism, for example,
which Hegel sees as a sentiment that "habitually recognizes that the
community is one's substantive groundwork and end," is "simply a
product of the institutions subsisting in the state" {PR, 163-64). It
thus foflows that different states or a state as it changes historically
will produce different customs and traditions. This production requires
that mind pass through a process of education {Bildung) and this education is a discipline {PR, 165). For example, in discussing the rise of
modern Germany out of the Middle Ages, Hegel says:
The two iron rods which were the instrument of this discipline were
the Church and serfdom. The Church drove the "Heart" to
desperation—made Spirit pass through the severest bondage. . . . In
the same way serfdom, which made a man's body not his own, but
the property of another, dragged humanity through all the harbarism
of slavery. . . . It was not so much/rom slavery as through slavery that
humanity was emancipated. . . . it is from this intemperate and
ungovernable state of volition that the discipline in question emancipated him. "5
In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel puts it in more general terms: "Mind
attains its actuality only by creating a dualism within itself, by submitting itself to physical needs and the chain of these external
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necessities, and so imposing on itself this barrier and this finitude,
and finally by educating {bildet) itself inwardly even when under this
barrier until it overcomes it and attains its objective reality in the
finite."" In the modern state, civil society is one of the most important institutions which provide this discipline or education. In the first
place, it produces in individuals the habit of work. At the same time,
it makes individuals dependent upon one another for the satisfaction
of their needs. Finally, as we have seen, it turns self-seeking into a
contribution to the satisfaction of the needs of all such that self-interest
leads to the universal {PR, 129-30).
But still, how can commerce, trade, and wealth, which are
generated in civil society, avoid corrupting custom and tradition and
become compatible with Sittlichkeit? Hegel is certainly aware of
Rousseau's argument that particular interest destroys custom and tradition. In fact, in the Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Hegel's
general picture of the historical course of nations is quite similar to
Rousseau's. For Hegel, nations in their youth create their own ethics,
customs, and religion, and individuals assimuate themselves to them.
The nation actively struggles to realize itself in the actual world and
to make itself what it is. Once this has been accomplished, the nation
starts to become inactive, self-indulgent, and it stagnates. At this point,
"[ijndividual interests seize control of the powers and resources which
were formerly dedicated to the whole." "Individuals withdraw into
themselves and pursue their own ends, and this . . . is the nation's
undoing." As the nation declines, a new higher principle emerges,
but always in another nation {IPH, 58-63). Thus, for Hegel much as
for Rousseau, particular interests cause the downfall and corruption
of nations.
But in the Philosophy of Right, while Hegel admits that particular
interest or subjectivity destroyed the ancient world, he nevertheless
insists that particular interest is an essential part of freedom {PR, 10,
123, 160. IPH, 70), and he claims that the "principle of modern states
has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of
subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of selfsubsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it
back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself {PR, 161). In other words, the key here
is that wealth, commerce, and trade as well as the particular interests
they promote do not ultimately erode custom, tradition, and Sittlichkeit,
as Rousseau argued, because in civil society particular interest is not
only compatible with the universal, it actively generates the universal.
Rousseau could not see this.
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Hegel recognizes that customs and traditions change as they are
molded by changing social and political institutions, and he develops
a theory which allows us to understand this change without concluding
that it will lead to corruption. He takes up Kant's philosophy of history
and Adam Smith's concept of an invisible hand to show that particular interests and the customs and traditions formed by the discipline
of civil society lead unconsciously to the common good. Far from being
opposed to the common good and leading to corruption as for
Rousseau, they lead to and reinforce the universal and thus are perfectly compatible with Sittlichkeit.
We have seen that Hegel objects to Kantian morality because
it was abstract—cut off from the concrete world. He instead wants
a morality rooted in the world of custom, tradition, feeling, passion,
and interest. He wants Sittlichkeit, not Moralität. In this respect he is
like Rousseau. But, as we have also seen, Rousseau's ideal society
is a Utopia where healthy customs and traditions simply must be given
and where wealth and particular interest are a main source of their
corruption. Thus, Hegel also appeals to Kant's dynamic philosophy
of history so that he can envision the realization of an ideal state that
can be compatible with wealth, commerce, and trade in the modern
world. Hegel is able to make this very important connection between
Kant and Rousseau because he is able to see two things: first, that
given the socioeconomic interdependence of each upon all, particular
interests can lead to the universal, and second, that social institutions,
especially civil society, through education and discipline, produce
customs and traditions that reinforce the tendency of particular interests
to realize the universal. Thus, this Kantian dynamic not only leads
to the universal, but is now concrete, that is, tied up with particular
interests, passions, and activity which will produce a discipline that
shapes customs and traditions as weU as molds feelings, sentiments,
and particular interests together with the universal common good.
Thus, we have three things: (1) morality which exists concretely
in the world tied up with interests and passions. It exists there before
us. We have Sittlichkeit, not an unrealized ought. (2) Yet this Sittlichkeit
does not just have to be given or presupposed in Utopian fashion as
for Rousseau. It develops and is dynamic without becoming corrupted.
And (3) it realizes the universal—the general will or the categorical
imperative—not by a "virtue" which exists outside the concrete but
in and through concrete interests and individuality.
While Hegel certainly accepts that part of Rousseau's concept
of the general will which holds that individual interests realize the
universal, he is nevertheless quite critical of other aspects of Rousseau's
concept of the general will. Hegel says that Rousseau
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takes the will only in a determinate form as the individual will, and
he regards the universal will not as the absolutely rational element
in the will, but only as a "general" will which proceeds out of this
individual will as out of a conscious will. The result is that he reduces
the union of individuals in the state to a contract and therefore to
something based on their arbitrary wills, their opinion, and their
capriciously given express consent; and abstract reasoning proceeds
to draw the logical inferences which destroy the absolutely divine principle of the state, together with its majesty and absolute authority."

Most commentators misunderstand what Hegel is saying here.
They think he is criticizing Rousseau for understanding the general
will as a particular will or the will of all." Rousseau certainly does
not do this and Hegel is not claiming that he does. By "individual
will," Hegel does not mean "particular will." Hegel is here making
much the same sort of criticism of Rousseau that, as we saw in Section II above, he made of Kant. Hegel is claiming that Rousseau
understands the general will only from the perspective of individual
consciousness—that for Rousseau only individual consciousnesses exist.
Thus, for Rousseau, the general will is seen as the outcome of individual wills willing the common good rather than as the outcome
of spirit. It follows from this that the individual wills must vote, that
they are responsible for establishing the laws of the state, and thus
that individuals rule. Hegel does not believe that all individuals should
vote and he certainly does not believe that they should rule.2° He
believes that this sort of thing led to the French Revolution. Moreover,
while the individual will, for Rousseau, does realize the universal or
general will, it sustains only an external relation to the general will
much as virtue was external to the way of the world for Kant {PS,
358-59, NL, 85-89).
For Hegel to be able to reconcile the Kantian-Smithian principle
of conflicting interests with Rousseauian custom, tradition, and Sittlichkeit, self-interest must not be thought to produce a universal external
to itself. Self-interest must be understood to sustain an internal relation to the universal as its own essence. It must implicitly be the universal. For Rousseau, particular interest is seen as external to the universal
much as interest or inclination were seen as external to and thus incompatible with morality and freedom for Kant. Thus, for Rousseau,
in a society in which particular interest is powerful, it will be impossible to achieve the universal—the general will. Particular interest will
appear to erode the ethical basis of the state—it will erode custom,
tradition, and Sittlichkeit. Since particular interest and the universal
are external and opposed to each other, the realization of one excludes
the realization of the other. Particular interest is heteronomous. If viewed from the perspective of individual will where individuals sustain
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an external relation to the universal, Hegel agrees that one would have
to come to the conclusion, much as Rousseau did, that particular interest erodes the universal. After all, Hegel himself admits that particular interest destroyed the ancient community. For Hegel, we must
transcend the perspective of individual consciousness. Particular interests and the universal must be viewed as internally related—as two
interacting elements of one spiritual reality, each molding and forming the other. The universal must be seen as the essential manifestation of the individuals and individuals as disciplined by the universal.
Then particular interests—wealth, trade, and commerce—will not be
seen as heteronomous. They wül be seen as compatible with the universal and with freedom. Individuals will be related to their own essence
within Sittlichkeit and community. To make this clearer, however, we
must say a good deal more about spirit as well as about its relationship to the state and to the individual citizens.
IV. Hegel's concept of spirit is most difficult to understand, let alone
accept. In this section, I simply wish to explain this concept as clearly
as possible without getting lost in details so that we can understand
the political and historical views that depend upon it. I do not expect
to persuade anyone of, nor am I persuaded by, every single thing
involved here. At any rate, in the Phenomenology, Hegel discusses the
rise of the modern state, and here we find a most important treatment of how spirit develops through alienation and estrangement (PS,
295-321). The development of the modern state and of culture occurs
through a dialectical interaction that takes place between individual
self-consciousness and the objective world. The very existence and
development of this objective world, as well as the actualization and
development of individual self-consciousness, depend upon the fact that
self-consciousness alienates itself. Both sides here, which have become
split and self-opposed, are in reality two sides of one spiritual unity.
This fact, however, is not recognized by either side (PS, 294-95).
Individual self-consciousness, for Hegel, alienates itself—it gives up
its very essence—and thus objectifies itself in the world in the form
of the state. The individual must alienate itself, in other words, it
must serve, recognize, and obey this state. The state only becomes
actual by gaining this recognition, obedience, and service. Through
this objectiñcation, individual self-consciousness gains concreteness and
universality. It sets itself up as the universal spiritual substance (PS,
306ff.); the state, for Hegel, is nothing but the objectified essence—
the recognition, service, and sacrifice—of individual self-consciousness.
Individual self-consciousness creates its world through alienation,
but at the same time its world takes on a life of its own and appears
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independent of individual self-consciousness. The objectified state power
turns upon individucils. It becomes estranged. It dominates and controls them. It demands their obedience and recognition. In this way
it molds, disciplines, and educates individuals. It demands that they
conform themselves to this universal substance. As individual selfconsciousness alienates itself, conforms itself, recognizes, and serves
this state, the state gains reaility; it becomes universal, accepted, and
recognized. The more power this state gains, the more power it will
have to mold and discipline the individual subjects and make them
conform to this universal reality.
The subject is being constituted by and as a universal actual
substance. The state gains in reality by embodying and institutionalizing the reality, the essence, the service of the subjects. The subjects gain reality in being disciplined by, in conforming to, and in
being recognized by the universal reality of the state. The state is
the subject's own reality—its essence, its self. At the same time, the
state disciplines its subjects, educates them, and lifts them to
universality.
Both individual self-consciousness and the objective world of the
state are at the same time parts of, and are constituting, a single
spiritual unity—a single cultural world which is divided and selfopposed. But this unity goes unrecognized. Moreover, it must go
unrecognized. If either side were to understand this mutual process,
their development would falter. If individual self-consciousness saw that
the state was its own alienated essence, it would cease to take the
state as essential or to respect and serve it. If the state were to see
its dependence on its subjects, the state would also cease to take itself
seriously. It would cease to take itself as essential and universal, and
thus it would lose the power to effectively mold and discipline its subjects toward this universality {PS, 310-13).
What is occurring here, despite the fact that it is estranged and
goes unrecognized, is that individual self-consciousness is being related
to and rooted in the objective substantial world, not in the sense of
being related heteronomously to something other and outside itself,
but, in the sense that the other, the objective, is its own essence, is
itself objectified. Moreover, this other—which is its essence—is the
universal. It has the universal and rational form of the state and its
laws. Individual self-consciousness is thus establishing itself as the
universal.
Ultimately, for Hegel, this estrangement and lack of recognition
must be overcome. To be free, individual self-consciousness must come
to see that the objective order is its universalized essence, and it must
consciously will to serve and obey that universal, rational, and objec-
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tive order rather than be dominated and coerced to do so. This recognition, for Hegel, can only be gained after self-consciousness has been
raised to the level of religion. As we see in following sections of the
Phenomenology, religion, the relationship between individual selfconsciousness and God which embraces the totality of things, develops
through a dialectical process of interaction much like that between
individual self-consciousness and the state. Each establishes and realizes
the other {PS, 329-54, 453-78). Religion, for Hegel, is spirit's selfconsciousness. Religion is the spirit of a people or of a culture reflecting upon itself, understanding itself, and committing itself to its mission and its truth. Only at this level do we gain a consciousness with
sufficient scope and universality to see that individual self-consciousness
and the objective state are simply two interacting parts of one spiritual
unity, and only then can we consciously will to serve and obey that
objective order which we see is our own essence.
In the last section of the Phenomenology, Hegel says, this "alienation of self-consciousness . . . has not merely a negative but a positive
meaning . . . on the one hand self-consciousness itself alienates itself;
for in doing so it establishes itself as object, or, by reason of the
indivisible unity characterizing self-existence, sets up the object as
itself" This is the process of alienation establishing the state that we
have just discussed. Hegel continues:
there is also this other moment in the process, that self-consciousness
has equally superseded this self-alienation and objectification, and is
thus at home with itself in its otherness as such. . . . The cultivated
self-consciousness, which has traversed the world of spirit in selfestrangement, has, through its self-alienation, produced the thing as
its own self; it retains itself, therefore, still in the thing, and knows
the thing to have no independence."

Thus, when self-consciousness realizes that the object has no
independence, that the object is the result of its own alienation, selfconsciousness knows the object as itself and is no longer estranged.
Estrangement, from the beginning, meant that the subject and the
object were two sides of the same spiritual unity. They had become
split and self-opposed such that this unity went unrecognized. When
this unity is recognized, the estrangement is overcome. Even objectification has been overcome. The object no longer appears as an
independent other. It appears as one's own essence.
Hegel's political aim is not to change or remake the world, but
to reconcile us to it by allowing us to grasp it in thought fully and
adequately {PR, 11-12). Estrangement is overcome by recognizing what
it is. Individual self-consciousness does not cease to alienate itself; it
simply recognizes that it alienates itself. It recognizes that the state

Philip J. Kain

361

is its own essence. It then continues to alienate itself, to serve and
conform itself to the state, its own essence, but now it does so consciously and thus becomes free.
To understand these matters more completely, we must discuss
their metaphysical and epistemological background. Hegel's Introduction to the Encyclopaedia, while interspersed with a discussion of other
matters, attempts to review the history of philosophy. Hegel indicates
the strengths and weaknesses of past philosophical systems and indicates
what in them must be preserved as philosophy develops. Later
philosophical systems, for Hegel, are always the outcome of previous
philosophical systems {L, 23). Hegel certainly views his own system
this way.
For Hegel, the strength of traditional (pre-Kantian) metaphysics,
and what must be preserved from it, is its lack of any antithesis
between subject and object. Traditional metaphysics believes that it
brings universal objects before the mind as they really are. It takes
the laws and forms of thought to be the laws and forms of things.
Thought grasps the very nature of things; it directly grasps absolute,
objective, universal reality {L, 60-61).
On the other hand, modern empiricism abandons metaphysics
and turns to experience. For empiricism, whatever is true must be
a particular in the actual world and immediately present to sensation.
Individuals must feel themselves present and involved in every fact
of knowledge they accept. While the object is merely subjective
experience, nevertheless, this experience is immediately present and
completely certain to consciousness (L, 12, 76-78).
Kant's criticcd philosophy also considers experience to be the sole
foundation for cognition. Moreover, all experience, for Kant, presupposes a transcendental unity of self-consciousness. The multiplicity of
diverse sensations is brought into a unity only within a unified selfconsciousness. These sensations are constituted into an object by this
self-consciousness (L, 82, 87-89). Thus, Kant's strength is the same
as empiricism's strength; an object must be my immediate experience
for knowledge to be possible. But also, for Hegel, Kant's strength
lies in the most important notion that the object is constituted by
self-consciousness.
Hegel's philosophical system combines and synthesizes the
strengths of these three previous philosophical systems. It combines
the direct grasp of universal objective reality characteristic of traditional metaphysics with the Kantian and empiricist principle that all
experience is immediately mine within consciousness, and it combines
these with the Kantian principle that all objects are constituted within
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a single unified self-consciousness. Hegel's system is a reorganized synthetic unity of the positive achievements of all previous philosophy.
To achieve this synthesis, Hegel must abandon Kant's unknown
thing-in-itself, which he very clearly finds unacceptable in any case
(L, 91-92), and he must abandon the perspective of individual
consciousness.
Since Hegel rejects the unknown thing-in-itself but still holds that
experience is constituted by self-consciousness, he clearly cannot hold
that self-consciousness constitutes mere phenomenal appearance cut
off from a noumenal thing-in-itself which remains unknown. If we
constitute experience and if the thing-in-itself is not to be unknown
but known, then, for Hegel, we must constitute reality.
But if it were only individual self-consciousness that constituted
reality we would be plunged into a subjectivist chaos. What is required
is an absolute self-consciousness (L, 93-94)—the consciousness of God,
or a consciousness which has raised itself to the absolute perspective
of God, which is to say, for Hegel, the religious self-consciousness
of a developed culture. Here we have a total and universal consciousness which in constituting reality (as for Kant) would have reality
immediately present to itself within consciousness (as for Kant and
empiricism), and since it includes all re2ility—there being no reality
outside such a consciousness—it would also have that immediate grasp
of objective reality characteristic of traditional metaphysics. The subjective principle of modern philosophy is compatible with the objectivity of traditional philosophy only for an absolute consciousness. God's
subjectivity, because of its totality, is objective and absolute. Thus,
in overcoming estrangement, as we have seen, cultural or religious
self-consciousness faces all of reality constituted by itself and
immediately present to itself as its own essence.
We must notice that what we have just said here describes at
the metaphysical and epistemological level exactly what we earlier said
about freedom in the moral and political sphere. Hegel's view that
the subjective rationality of the individual must fit with the objective
rationality embedded in the laws and institutions of the state is the
same as his claim that the objective reality of traditional metaphysics
must be immediately grasped within the subjective consciousness of
individuals. This identity of subject and object is possible because the
subject has constituted the object as its own essence through a dialectical process of alienation. Moreover, the fact that freedom requires
that this identity of subjective and objective rationality be reinforced
by custom, tradition, and feeling is the same as Hegel's insistence
that our grasp of objective reality be brought home to the personal
and particular experience of the individual that we find in empiricism.
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Furthermore, as particular interests come into conflict, they lead
to the universal—to rationality objectively embedded in our world in
agreement with subjective rationality, that is, to the objectivity of traditional metaphysics. That they do so without being external to the
universal (as self-interest was external to the general will for Rousseau
or as Kantian virtue was external to the way of the world) can now
be more clearly understood because it has become clear how individual
interests and the universal are two interacting parts of one spiritual
unity that constitute each other. The universal is produced as the
alienation of the particular actions of individuals. The universal or
the state is the individual's essence—its self—alienated and objectified.
Particular interests and the universal are not heteronomous. They
appear to be external to each other only if we adopt the perspective
of individual consciousness.
Moreover, from what we have already said, we can also begin
to understand more clearly the higher form of Sittlichkeit that Hegel
wants for the modern world. This Sittlichkeit combines the rational
reflective component of Moralität with the transcendence of the ought
found in traditional Sittlichkeit. This higher Sittlichkeit is rational reflective morality concretely embedded in the customs, traditions, character,
and feeling of individuals—the objective ethical substance of traditional
metaphysics (the identity of subjective and objective reason) embedded
in the personal experience of the individual (as for empiricism). This
connection is possible because of the dialectical process by which individuals constitute their substantial ethical world as their own essence
and then are disciplined and educated by it.
All that we have said so far in this section will also help us to
understand the transition from civil society to the state as it appears
in the Philosophy of Right. Critics often object that Hegel is not a liberal,
that he in fact subordinates individuals to a powerful and authoritarian
state. This, at least in part, is very misleading. In the first place,
civil society is the realm in which individual will has its rights, the
realm where particular interests legitimately claim their satisfaction,
and this is a crucial element of freedom of Hegel.
In civil society, particular interests are viewed, much as for Kant
and Rousseau, from the perspective of individual consciousness and
therefore individual will appears to remain external to the universal.
Particular interests do lead to the universal, but they do so only
unconsciously. Thus, for Hegel, we must move to the level of the
state where consciousness transcends the realm of individual will and
enters the realm of spirit. Here the rationality implicit in civil society
(the unconscious tendency of particular interests to realize the universal) is posited and administered as law and thus becomes conscious.

364

Hegel's Political Theory and Philosophy of History

is recognized, and made actual {PR, 134-36). Here individual selfconsciousness and the universal are not external to one another.
Estrangement from the objective and universal states that power has
been overcome and thus individuals consciously will the universal and
become free.
Hegel continuously tells us in the Philosophy of Right that the relationship that is established between the individual citizens and the
ethical substance—the laws and institutions of the state—is such that
individuals are related to their own essence, their own substance."
Indeed, we have now seen what Hegel means here. The state is the
alienated essence of the individual citizens. The state is constituted
by them, but not as an other—not as heteronomous. The state is their
own essence objectified and universalized. Hegel does indeed subordinate individuals to the state, but thus only to their own essence—to
themselves. This, then, is a form of objective self-determination because
the subjective reason of the individual accords with the rationality
objectively embedded in the laws and institutions of the state.^^
For freedom to be realized, particular interests cannot lead to
the universal unconsciously as they do in civil society; the state cannot be one's own essence in an estranged form without this being
consciously recognized; and subjective and objective reason cannot
accord unconsciously. All of this must occur consciously.'^* We must
recognize that particular interests do lead to the universal and begin
to consciously pursue the universal in pursuing our own interests. We
must recognize that the state is our own essence and subordinate
ourselves to it consciously and intentionally. We must recognize that
subjective and objective reason accord and act consciously for the sake
of objective as well as subjective reason—for the sake of the rational
laws as well as our own rational maxims. Moreover, the objective
rational laws of the state immediately present to the subjective rationality of the individual give rise to a discipline which molds the
customs, feelings, and interests of the individual so that they too consciously support the universal. Thus we have Sittlichkeit in the modern
state {PR, 105).
Hegel wants to combine the subjectivity of the modern world
with the objectivity of the ancient world. Both civil society and the
state are crucially important here. Without civil society, there would
be no individualism and no realm for the satisfaction of particular
interest which is so important as an element of freedom. There would
be no conflict of interests as an actual force leading to the universal
either within the state or in history. And there would be no rootedness
in concrete interests, passions, property, trade, and commerce. Without
civil society, the realm of the state and spirit would float into abstrae-
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tion. On the other hand, without the state, individuals would never
rise above particular interests; they would never get beyond an
unconscious tendency toward the universal. They would never get
beyond subjective reason to reason embedded objectively in their laws
and institutions. They would never confront their own essence objectified and thus could not be free in obeying the state. In short, they
would not reach spirit.
To reconcile modern subjectivity with traditional objectivity, two
things are necessary: (1) the objective must be absorbed within the
subjective, not exist independently outside it. And (2) the subjective
must gain enough scope and universality to be objective and absolute.
It must embrace the totality of things like a God whose subjectivity
is objective because it is total.
By lifting individual self-consciousness to spirit we see that the
state is our own essence, that subjective and objective reason are identical, that the objective reality of traditional metaphysics is immediately
grasped within subjective consciousness. The objective world is not
other or heteronomous, but is absorbed within subjective consciousness.
But subjective consciousness at this point is no longer merely an individual consciousness. It has been molded and disciplined by the objective substantial power of the state. It has become the cultural consciousness of a people. It has been lifted to the universal, to objective
ethical rationality. At the level of the state, this consciousness becomes
the final highest authority—the sovereignty of the state constitutes consciousness as sovereign. In this way, subjective consciousness gains
scope and universality.
Hegel is certainly not an authoritarian, let alone a totalitarian.
As Avineri has shown, there is even a strong element of pluralism
in Hegel's thought." Hegel also endorses freedom of the press and
of speech, and he advocates social mobility {PR, 132, 205). The state
is also very definitely concerned with the protection of individuals,
their property, and their particular interests, but these are not the
ultimate aims of the state {PR, 71, 156, 209). The ultimate aim of
the state is to lift its citizens to spirit, to their own essence, and to
the Divine. Only at this level is the individual fully realized, at home
with itself, and rationally self-determined.
Hegel wants to avoid a sovereign like that of Hobbes who is
external to the citizens and wields power over them. Nor will he accept
a state like that of Rousseau, for whom the people are sovereign. Just
as much, he wants to avoid Kant's autocrat who is external to the
citizens and wields power over them as much as for Hobbes despite
the fact that the autocrat gives the people the laws they would have
given themselves." For Hegel, the citizens do not give themselves their
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own laws by voting on them as for Rousseau. The citizens, however,
do get the sorts of laws they would have given themselves, but they
are not given to them by an autocrat as for Kant. The laws and
institutions of the state, for Hegel, arise through the historical development of spirit in which the subjective rationedity of individuals accords
with the objective rationality embedded in the laws of the state—the
laws of the state are the laws that subjective rationality would give
itself. Through alienation the citizens create the state as their own
essence and are molded by their state. For Hegel the government or
the state is not external to the citizens; it is their own essence. For
Hegel, sovereignty must be understood not at the level of individual
will—the individual will either of a people or a government—but at
the level of spirit. Hegel's view of sovereignty is thus quite new.
No one of the powers or agencies in the state is sovereign for
Hegel. They have no independent authority, but are grounded in the
Idea of the whole {PR, 179-80). Certainly the monarch is not sovereign.
Any state simply requires an agency with the authority of final decision, otherwise disputes could continue eternally. This authority of
final decision rests with the monarch. But this just means that the
monarch has "to say yes and dot the ' i ' . " " Generally speaking,
Hegel's monarch is rather weak.'^* Hegel does at times speak of the
monarch as sovereign {PR, 182, 186), but by this he means that the
monarch is a figurehead who represents sovereignty. On the other
hand, at least in home affairs, Hegel is willing to say that sovereignty
resides in the people, not the people as an aggregate of individual
wills but the people as the whole of the state {PR, 182-83). Sovereignty lies in the organic whole bound together by Sittlichkeit at the level
of spirit. It does not lie either with the government or the people
understood as individual wUls. It lies in this spiritual totality as a whole.
This possibility is due to the cohesion of this whole which is bound
together by the integration of particular interests embedded in property, commerce, and trade which nevertheless lead to the universal.
The whole is also bound together by custom, tradition, and Sittlichkeit
which embed this universal in individual feeling and character. It is
bound together in that subjective reason and objective reason are identical and in the sense that the state is one's own essence. For Hegel
the sovereign is not to be seen as an entity which wields power over
others from outside.^' Rather, Hegel is concerned with power and
authority which binds people together, makes them cohere, lifts them
to their own essence at the level of spirit, and makes them rationally
self-determined. They are not ruled by the subjective rationality of
either the government or the people, but by the objective rationality
embedded in the state as a whole which, however, accords with the
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subjective rationality of each. To return to individual will, to insist
upon voting or subjective rationality, in Hegel's opinion, would be
to break this spiritual whole and to move toward making individual
will sovereign, either the individual will of a government or that of
the aggregate of the people. If one chooses the latter, then as for
Rousseau, we would have to give up wealth, commerce, and trade
and thus the ideal society would be impossible in the modern world.
Santa Glara University
Santa Glara, Galifornia
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